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# CHALLENGING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION?

## A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE APPROACHES OF THE EMERGING POWERS

**Tom De Bruyn**

***Project coordination: dr. Huib Huyse***

*Second working paper in the series "Challenging the Status Quo?  
The Impact of the Emerging Economies on the  
Global Governance of Development Cooperation"*

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### **SAMENVATTING**

Dit onderzoeksrapport is het tweede in een reeks studies die de effecten van de zogenaamde economische groeilanden op ontwikkelingsamenwerkingsbeleid bestuderen. Terwijl het eerste een beschrijving gaf van de aanpak en de kenmerken van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking van Brazilië, India, China en Zuid-Afrika (BICS) inzake gezondheid en landbouw en voedselzekerheid (per land afzonderlijk), analyseert het tweede rapport de aanpak van de 'niet-DAC ontwikkelingspartners' in het algemeen, en illustreert dit met voorbeelden uit de hogergenoemde sectoren. Net als het eerste rapport is de informatie gebaseerd op een literatuurstudie.

*Geschiedenis:* Brazilië, India en China hebben reeds een traditie als verschaffers van en partner in ontwikkelingssamenwerking die teruggaat tot de jaren vijftig en wortelt in internationale gebeurtenissen en processen, zoals de Bandung conferentie van 1955 en de vorming van de Beweging van niet-gealigneerde landen in 1961, de publicatie van de acht principes van economische hulp en technische bijstand aan het buitenland van de PR China in 1964, de vorming van de G77 en de UNCTAD in 1964. Reeds in de jaren 1970 werd het concept Zuid-Zuidsamenwerking gelanceerd binnen de Verenigde Naties, verwijzend naar uitwisseling van expertise, goederen, technologie en personeel tussen actoren uit Latijns Amerika, Afrika en Azië. Na een periode van minder intense samenwerking, nam de Zuid-Zuidsamenwerking terug toe eind jaren negentig en vooral in de jaren 2000 (onder meer door het eind van de Koude Oorlog en de economische groei van de BICS, alsook het einde van het apartheidsregime in Zuid-Afrika).

*Budget:* het is vooralsnog zeer moeilijk om een exacte inschatting te maken van de ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbudgetten van de niet-DAC landen, en dan vooral voor specifieke sectoren zoals gezondheidszorg en landbouw. Dit wordt onder andere bemoeilijkt door het feit dat deze landen verschillende types van financiering aanwenden voor hun ontwikkelingssamenwerking en niet afzonderlijk over de officiële ontwikkelingshulp rapporteren. Voor de BICS zou het cijfer op een US\$ 3 miljard liggen in 2010 oftewel tussen de 2% en 3% van de totale globale officiële ontwikkelingshulp vertegenwoordigen.

*Actoren:* terwijl de institutionele overheidsstructuur van de PR China voor de opmaak van het beleid inzake ontwikkelingssamenwerking zeer gecentraliseerd is, hebben de meeste andere niet-DAC landen, en dan vooral Brazilië, India en Zuid-Afrika een veelheid van verschillende instellingen die een deel van het beleid bepalen. Bovendien worden er de laatste jaren nieuwe structuren opgericht om het beleid te beheren en te bepalen. Typerend is wel de grote rol van sectorspecifieke instellingen voor de ontwikkeling en uitvoering van het beleid. De belangrijkste beslissingen worden echter wel vaak op het hoogste niveau (*i.e.* presidentieel) genomen. De private sector neemt

een belangrijke plaats in in het beleid, maar er bestaat een gebrek aan onderzoek om hier sluitende uitspraken over te doen. De NGO sector is daarentegen vrijwel afwezig.

*Discours:* de BICS en veel andere niet-DAC landen gebruiken in grote mate eenzelfde discours en schrijven zich niet expliciet in in de principes van de Verklaring van Parijs. Kernwaarden omvatten: gelijkwaardige partnerschappen, wederzijdse baten, solidariteit, geen voorwaarden, geen inmenging in binnenlandse zaken, vraaggestuurd en delen van eigen ervaringen. Afrika wordt alsmaar belangrijker als partnerregio voor Brazilië, India, China en Zuid-Afrika.

*Modaliteiten:* de meeste samenwerking van de BICS verloopt bilateraal, maar vooral Brazilië exploreert in toenemende mate trilaterale samenwerking. Terwijl Brazilië vooral technische assistentie verschaft, maken China en India ook gebruik van kredietverschaffing en giften. Andere populaire modaliteiten omvatten projectsteun en beurzen, onderzoek en ontwikkeling en beleidsbeïnvloeding op internationaal niveau.

*Coördinatie:* alhoewel er inspanningen worden gedaan tot meer samenwerking met de BICS, blijft coördinatie tussen traditionele donoren en de niet-DAC landen beperkt. Tussen de BICS zelf bestaan er wel enkele samenwerkingsinitiatieven. De belangrijkste staan bekend als BASIC, BRICS en IBSA.

*Uitdagingen:* de niet-DAC ontwikkelingspartners en dan vooral Brazilië, India, China en Zuid-Afrika dagen de 'traditionele' ontwikkelingssamenwerking op tien manieren uit:

1. ze verschaffen een extra bron van inkomsten aan de ontwikkelingslanden;
2. ze maken gebruik van een mix van verschillende financiële instrumenten;
3. ontwikkelingssamenwerking is een instrument van hun buitenlands beleid en dient vrij expliciet hun buitenlandse belangen;
4. ze maken gebruik van een ander discours dan dat van de 'traditionele donoren';
5. de voorwaarden die ze stellen aan hun ontwikkelingssamenwerking zijn zeer beperkt;
6. ze investeren in meer harde sectoren en concentreren zich op economische groei als motor van ontwikkeling;
7. de private sector neemt een centrale plaats in in hun ontwikkelingssamenwerking;
8. expertise en kennis die de BICS hebben geleerd uit hun eigen geschiedenis om bepaalde ontwikkelingsvraagstukken aan te pakken, worden geacht beter aan te sluiten bij de context van ontwikkelingslanden. Specifieke aandacht verdient ICT en 'frugal' innovatieve oplossingen voor bestaande uitdagingen;
9. in gezondheid hebben de BICS waardevolle expertise in de aanpak van HIV/AIDS, malaria en andere tropische en/of overdraagbare ziekten, de productie van medicijnen, openbare gezondheidszorg en institutionele versterking. In landbouw en voedselzekerheid beschikken ze nuttige expertise in het bestrijden van honger en armoede bij kinderen, het stimuleren van landbouwproductie, agro-business en kleinschalige landbouw;
10. de zogenaamde opkomst van de BICS of de hernieuwde aandacht voor hun activiteiten doet vragen rijzen over coördinatie van activiteiten en geeft mogelijkheden tot nieuwe vormen van samenwerking en partnerschappen.

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## PREFACE

This paper is the second in a series for the four year research (2012-2015) 'Challenging the status-quo? The impact of the emerging economies on the global governance of development cooperation'. The research is commissioned by the Flemish Government and framed within the Flemish Policy Research Centre for Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation and carried out by the Belgian Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA). It examines the characteristics (actors, motivation, objectives, means, methods) of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS) and their effects on the organisation and methods of development cooperation in general and western donors in particular. Specific attention is given to development cooperation in health in Mozambique, and agriculture and food security in Malawi. While the first paper (see De Bruyn, 2013) presented four country studies and looked for the BICS' involvement in health and agriculture and food security (AFS), this second research paper builds further on insights of the first paper and elaborates the main features of these countries' general development cooperation approaches and illustrates these with examples from health and AFS. The third and fourth research papers focus on the involvement of the BICS in the agriculture and food security sector in Malawi and the health sector in Mozambique. The current and future results of the research are presented on the website of the Policy Research Centre.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.prc-if.eu](http://www.prc-if.eu).

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ABC</b>	Agência Brasileira de Cooperação
<b>AFS</b>	agriculture and food security
<b>ARF</b>	African Renaissance Fund
<b>ARV</b>	antiretroviral
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>BASIC</b>	Brazil, South Africa, India, China
<b>BICS</b>	Brazil, India, China and South Africa
<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
<b>CPLP</b>	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
<b>CSO</b>	civil society organisation
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DBSA</b>	Development Bank of Southern Africa
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>DIRCO</b>	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>FOCAC</b>	Forum on China - Africa Cooperation
<b>GAVI</b>	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation
<b>GFATM</b>	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
<b>GHP</b>	Global health partnership
<b>IBSA</b>	India, Brazil, South Africa
<b>IDC</b>	Industrial Development Cooperation
<b>IIDCA</b>	India International Development Cooperation Agency
<b>NAM</b>	Non-Alignment Movement
<b>NEPAD</b>	New Partnership for Africa's Development
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organisation
<b>ODA</b>	official development assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OOF</b>	other official flows
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>SADPA</b>	South African Development Partnership Agency
<b>SSC</b>	South-South Cooperation
<b>TB</b>	Tuberculosis
<b>TCDC</b>	Technical Cooperation among Development Countries
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
<b>UNDP</b>	United National Development Programme
<b>WFP</b>	World Food programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organisation
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organisation

## INTRODUCTION

In February 2012 a short viral internet movie was uploaded on the internet. A Caucasian woman, dressed in a yellow training suit, a blue stripe on her shoulders, clearly inspired by the heroine in Tarantino's movie *Kill Bill*, enters an empty warehouse. Spaghetti western-style music accompanies her. Suddenly, a Chinese Kung Fu master jumps from one of the higher girders in the building and menaces her with his martial arts moves. Next, an Indian Kalaripayattu fighter approaches her and threatens her with his sword. From a third side a Brazilian capoeira practitioner summersaults into the scene. The woman looks the three men surrounding her in the eyes, takes a meditative pose and splits into twelve versions of herself. Now the three men find themselves surrounded by a circle of identical women. They drop their weapons and aggressive attitudes and sit down following the women's example. In the final scene, the women change into stars, while the rest of the screen turns blue, thus showing the flag of the European Union. The movie ends with the slogan 'the more we are, the stronger we are'.

A week after its launch this promotional video of the European Commission had already been withdrawn. It received thousands of complaints of viewers, depicting it as racist and imperialist (Waterfield, 2012). Although the core message was about the benefits of the EU enlargement, the video unintentionally demonstrated the fear of a western institution for emerging economies as Brazil, India and China. Although there is no evidence that this fear is widely shared, there is clearly a growing interest (and indeed sometimes concern) for the 'new kids on the block' in many western media and academic and policy circles including that of development cooperation.

### The 'emergence' of the 'emerging donors'

Since the start as a policy field after the Second World War, western-based actors, including governmental agencies, multilateral institutions and NGOs dominated development cooperation. From around the turn of the century a whole new range of actors, including foundations, trade unions, farmers' movements, cooperatives, companies and migrant organisations have complemented these players (Develtere, 2012). But arguably the group that received most attention are those that became known as the emerging powers or donors - or as we prefer to call them the 'non-DAC development partners or actors'<sup>2</sup> (see further) - and more specifically Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS).

Almost every publication that describes the history of the involvement of the BRICS and other middle and lower income countries as actors in development cooperation, refers to the 2003 paper of Goldman Sachs 'Dreaming with the BRICs: the path to 2050' (see Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). Although changes in the world economic order have always been a popular subject of interest to economists and policy makers, the paper of Goldman Sachs managed to catch the attention. At the turn of the century, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China equalled less than 15% of the combined economies of the G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the USA). The authors predicted that by 2025 this percentage would grow to about 50% and by 2040 the former economies together would be larger than those of the G6. The paper

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<sup>2</sup> DAC refers to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).



determined to a large extent the terminology with which these countries were denoted: such as BRIC (and later on BRICS to include South Africa) and emerging economies.

This paper set in motion a whole stream of new studies, essays and reports that looked into the role and evolution of these countries in the world economy, and also in other societal and policy sectors - from culture to health to development cooperation. Authors tried to identify whether the BRIC and other emerging economies were or would be playing a more important role in these sectors by looking for instance at budgets, modalities and institutions.

Within the development cooperation sector, the debate gained momentum in 2006 when Richard Manning, the Chair of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) gave a landmark speech in which he referred to emerging donors in the development arena (see Manning, 2006). These donors went for a long time unnoticed but would challenge the traditional donor community in the following decade. He singled out India and China, but others quickly extended their attention to Brazil, and other non-DAC donors (Kragelund, 2010).

An immense body of literature emerged describing the characteristics of these (supposedly) new entrants and identifying their effects on the existing organisation and approaches and practices of development cooperation. Despite this attention, in 2010 Kragelund concluded that there was no 'reasonable accurate information about the scale, content, form, mode and sectoral distribution of non-traditional's development assistance' (2010: 18). In the last two years researchers and other authors have attempted to fill in the gaps in the knowledge, but there is still a long way to go. While broad overviews of the history, the institutional structure and some of the modalities of the bigger countries (and esp. Brazil, India and China) exist, information about the budget, sector-specific approaches and policies, the concrete situation on the field, and the smaller donors are still lagging behind. Consequently, the debate about the non-DAC development partners is warped by perceptions, hearsay and discourse rather than objective evidence and on practice based information.

## **Objectives and structure of the paper**

The four year study (2012-2015) 'Challenging the status-quo? The impact of the emerging economies on the global governance of development co-operation' attempts to address some of the gaps in the knowledge of the non-DAC development partners and features within the framework of the Policy Research Centre for the Development Cooperation of the Flemish Government.<sup>3</sup>

It focuses on the development cooperation approaches of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS)<sup>4</sup> and more specifically on health in Mozambique and agriculture and food security in Malawi.

To avoid confusion with the acronym BRICS or BRIC, we emphasise that the Russian Federation (the letter R in the acronym) is not included in this study and the four year

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<sup>3</sup> See [www.prc-if.eu](http://www.prc-if.eu).

<sup>4</sup> For methodological reasons, the study will exclude Russia. A future paper will describe in detail the methodology of the entire study. As mentioned in the first research paper (De Bruyn, 2013: 15): 'Important to note is that Brazil, India, China and South Africa are referred to as 'BICS'. However, we stress that this does not at all imply that these countries act or should be seen as a homogeneous block or entity. The only reason why this abbreviation is used in this paper is for reasons of brevity. For the same reason, 'the BICS' is used, meaning 'the countries belonging to group of countries of Brazil, India, China and South Africa', but admittedly a construction that can be contested from a grammatical point of view.'

research. This decision is not only made for reasons of scale (else the research would yet another country), but also because Brazil, India, China and South Africa all share an important history of receivers of aid and share a number of similar development challenges (Kragelund, 2010).

The first steps in the research aim to provide a background understanding of the general development cooperation approaches and the involvement in the aforementioned sectors. While the first paper presented four country studies and identified a number of general characteristics of the BICS' development cooperation (see Table 1.1), this paper will take a broader look and analyse these general approaches and characteristics in more depth (the history, the financial resources, the actors, the discourse, the instruments and modalities, the coordination), with illustrations from health and AFS.

Importantly, the analysis is entirely based on written material: policy documents and academic articles and books and written media. Interviews, statistical analyses or other information sources are not used for this paper, but will inform next research steps in which the conclusions of the literature reviews will be scrutinised. Besides findings from the country studies, general literature on the BICS is used. The multitude of studies, articles, books, blogs and other publications have made it difficult, if not impossible, to grasp the entire academic and other output. We have therefore opted to base the analysis on a number of authors who have attempted to make a critical compilation of the existing views, such as Kragelund, Kharas and Brautigam. We specifically mention the in 2012 published book 'From Recipients to Donors. Emerging Powers in the Changing Development Landscape' of the at the University of Cambridge based scholar Emma Mawdsley. This book succeeds in giving a relatively concise and clear overview of the current state of the art regarding academic knowledge on emerging donors. Furthermore, most of the literature is on the governmental involvement of the BICS in development cooperation. The private sector and civil society initiatives are under-researched. Vaes and Huyse (2013) give an overview of civil society and South-South cooperation, with a specific focus on the BICS, while forthcoming researches of HIVA and the Policy Research Centre will focus on the private sector and development cooperation in the BICS.<sup>5</sup>

### **Terminology: development cooperation and non-DAC development actors**

As mentioned in the first research paper, the study focuses on development approaches understood as approaches that 'are aimed at promoting political, social, economic or technical cooperation with Latin American, African or Asian countries in order to achieve development. What kind of development is dependent on the definition given by the actors involved. Importantly, the focus of the paper is thus not only development assistance or aid, as understood as Official Development Aid (ODA), but goes beyond this and entails also other kinds of cooperation and assistance' (De Bruyn, 2013: 14-15, and see §1.3 in this paper).

Furthermore, instead of emerging economies or donors, non-DAC development partners or actors is used in this paper. First, 'Emerging economies or donors' give the incorrect impression that countries such as the BICS only recently act as assisting, donating or cooperating actors in development cooperation (see §1.1). Second, the use of donors is rejected by countries such as Brazil, India and China since they reject the

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<sup>5</sup> See [www.prc-if.eu](http://www.prc-if.eu).

supposedly unequal donor-recipient relationship that this entails, and hence do not consider themselves as donors (see §1.5).

## **1. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OF BRAZIL, INDIA, CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA**

### **1.1 The longtime tradition of Brazil, India, China and South Africa in development cooperation**

#### *1.1.1 The origins: advocates of South-South cooperation*

The terminology used in the literature about the BICS is deceiving. Many 'emerging' or 'new donors' have had a history as donors or assisting partners in development or international cooperation (King, 2010; Molenaar, 2011; Chin & Qadir, 2012). Already from the 1950s, Brazil, China and India set up cooperation projects with other developing countries. Agriculture and health featured among the main assistance sectors. China started sending out medical and agricultural teams in the 1960s, while India gave equipment and Brazil provided technical assistance in agriculture for some decades. And all three countries have been offering scholarships and short training courses for about 40 years (Mawdsley, 2012; Chaturvedi *et al.*, 2012).

On the international level a series of events and processes are considered to be the predecessors of the current development cooperation policies of the 'not so new donors', as Mawdsley (2012) explains. The most important one - especially for India - is arguably the Bandung conference of 1955 and the subsequent creation of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961. While the Soviets and the West were vying for world hegemony and tried to incorporate African, Latin American and Asian countries in their sphere of influence, a number of countries refused to align themselves with one of them and tried to offer an alternative to these two blocks. India, Egypt, Yugoslavia and Indonesia were among the initiators of the NAM. The experiences and conclusions of the NAM are still evident in the current discourses of many of the 're-emerging donors'. In the same period, in 1964, the Chinese government published its eight principles of economic aid and technical assistance to foreign countries.

Two other events stand out: the formation of the G77 - resulting from the 1962 conference in Cairo on the 'Problems of Economic Development'; and the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, to promote economic cooperation and integration between developing countries. These gave rise to the Declaration of the New International Economic Order, in which a new political and economic framework was proposed based on equal relations between countries. Especially important was the 1978 UNCTAD Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. The Plan emphasised the role developing countries could play in looking for own development solutions. This plan marked an important stimulus for Brazil's cooperation initiatives. The UN General Assembly formalised its support for cooperation among developing countries, by setting up the Unit for South-South cooperation (SSC). Although the concept initially referred to trade among developing countries, it has become to imply 'the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and knowledge between 'developing' countries - a loose definition that can cover almost any form of interaction from South-South foreign direct investment by Asian, African and South-American multinational firms, to diplomatic meetings and agreements, to the provision of technical experts' (Mawdsley, 2012: 63). As such SSC is a much broader concept than foreign aid.

### *1.1.2 The re-emergence or re-discovery of development cooperation actors*

From the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, the cooperation between developing countries started to take another form. Global political and economic changes showed that the common principles or ground was often not that strong. Especially the oil crisis in the 1970s, the debt crisis in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War influenced dramatically the configuration, and even in a stand-still in commitment to South-South cooperation. Although bilateral commitments of China, India or Brazil to specific countries, in particular those geographically nearby, were carried on in agricultural, health and other sectors - China even broadened its cooperation to other countries following the diplomatic competition with Taiwan - Brazil, India and China main interest returned to domestic issues. Hence, development cooperation was left to the Northern countries (Mawdsley, 2012; Kragelund, 2010).

This might explain why Brazil, India and China were not included in the debate on development cooperation earlier. From the end of the 1990s and especially the beginning of the new millennium the Southern countries started to re-emerge on the development cooperation field, not as recipients but also as donors or partners. In addition South Africa joined the group. Until then, South Africa was the odd one out - although the apartheid government also assisted other African countries, its current policies only took form after the transition to democracy in 1994 (Sidiropoulos, 2012).

The re-emergence of Brazil, India and China could be seen in their rising share in the total development aid, the increase of regional meetings with other developing countries, the growth of trade and investment, and the surge of diplomatic visits of government representatives to other - mainly African - countries. Mawdsley (2012) proposes an additional interesting hypothesis, notably that part of these countries were merely invisible to the western academicians and donors. She gives the example of the Cuban aid to Haiti after the major earthquake in 2010. Although Cuba was the first to offer medical assistance to Haiti, it was completely ignored by western media, because the Cubans were not 'recognised' as aid workers. They did not fit the framework of the known western NGOs and aid agencies. Also most of the assistance-providing countries from Africa, Asia or Latin America, have had a history of receivers of aid - and thus it would be counterlogic to regard them as donors. And lastly, the 'fear' of the western countries for the 'emerging economies' as illustrated by the example in the introduction of this paper, might be an implicit motivating factor for the increased attention.

## **1.2 The characteristics of development cooperation of Brazil, India, China and South Africa: summary**

In the first research paper (see De Bruyn, 2013) I listed the main features of the general development cooperation approaches of Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Table 1.1 reproduces this summary. In the remainder of this paper, each of these issues will be dealt with in more detail in order to identify the similarities or difference between the BICS.

**Table 1.1 Main features of the development cooperation of Brazil, India, China and South Africa**

	<b>Brazil</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>South Africa</b>
Aid (in US\$) <sup>6</sup>	Estimates range from 362 million (2009) to 1.2 billion (2010)	Estimates range from 639 million (2009) to 1.48 billion (2007)	Estimates range from 2 billion (2010) to 3.1 billion (2008)	Lot of confusion, estimates around US\$ 100 million
Governmental institutional structure (leading actor)	Fragmented and implementation carried out by sector specific actors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Agência Brasileira do Cooperação)	Very fragmented and in process of change (Ministry of External Affairs)	Highly centralised structure, and implementation decentralised (Department of Foreign Aid of the Ministry of Commerce)	In process of change (DIRCO and in the future SADPA)
Principles	Solidarity, mutual benefit, demand driven, non-conditionality, non-interference, recognition of local expertise	Solidarity, mutual benefit	Equality, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, non-conditionality, emphasis on building self-reliance, the same standard of living for experts dispatched by China and local experts	Solidarity, mutual benefit, 'ubuntu'
Main financial instruments	Concessional loans and grants	Export credits, concessional loans and grants. Integration of commercial finance and aid	Grants, credit lines, interest free loans and concessional loans, but Other Official flow more important than ODA. Integration of commercial finance and aid	Grants and loans
Main modalities	Technical assistance, scholarships, humanitarian assistance, global advocacy	Scholarships, technical assistance, humanitarian assistance	'Complete projects', technical assistance, equipment, capacity building, emergency aid, volunteer programs	Projects, technical cooperation, humanitarian assistance
Main types of cooperation	Bilateral, multilateral and trilateral	Bilateral	Bilateral	Bilateral, multilateral trilateral
Country focus	Latin America and African countries (Lusophone in particular)	Neighbouring countries and Africa	Global, but increasingly Africa	Africa
Main sectors	Health, education, agriculture, social security	Agriculture, infrastructure, economic sectors and ICT	Infrastructure, productive sectors, agriculture, energy, health and agriculture	Post-conflict resolution, peace-building, regional integration

Source De Bruyn, 2013: 45

<sup>6</sup> In brackets the year to which estimate refers to.

## 1.3 Separating fact from fiction: looking for budgets

### 1.3.1 *Identifying development aid budgets*

One of the main challenges of academicians in the last years was the identification of committed and disbursed aid and development cooperation budgets of the non-DAC countries. Available data should be treated with caution because limited reporting, administrative burdens or reluctance to disclose information, different reporting systems, inadequate resources of donor agencies, and differing definitions of development aid and assistance render the calculation of exact figures very difficult (Mawdsley, 2012).

The organisational set-up of development cooperation, and specifically that within the sectors of health and AFS involves a multitude of different actors. While funds are provided by governments, private foundations and individuals and the business sector, the managing and the ultimate spending of the cooperation incorporates a more complex set of actors. Concentrating on the funders alone, the most reliable source of information is the OECD-DAC database. Besides the 24 DAC members, also 21 non-DAC members report to the OECD-DAC. Unfortunately for our analysis, Brazil, India, China nor South Africa are among them, but other calculations have been made which incorporate information about them. Nevertheless, the estimates differ to a certain extent.

Kharas (2012) states that of the roughly US\$ 200 billion ODA in 2008, US\$ 87 billion came from bilateral aid from DAC donors, US\$ 34 billion from multilateral donors, and US\$ 60-70 billion from private philanthropists. He mentions a figure of US\$ 15 billion from non-DAC official donors (which thus not include the BICS). Zimmerman and Smith (2011) calculated that in total these non-DAC countries together plus the BRIC (so this time South Africa is not included) channelled almost US\$ 11 billion to development aid, representing about 8% of the global total in 2009/2010. By 2010, this might have augmented to US\$ 14 billion, or 10-12% of the global total, according to calculations of Park (2011, see also Mawdsley, 2012). Bilal (2012) mentions a share of about 10% in 2009 for 25 countries engaged in 'South-South cooperation', incl. the BICS.

Based on most information it seems that the share of the BICS in the total official development aid, would be between 2% (according to Zimmerman and Smith 2011) and 3% (according to Bilal, 2012). With an aggregate total of about US\$ 3 billion for the BICS in 2010, the figures of the Global Humanitarian Assistance website<sup>7</sup> confirm these estimations. According to this website, the total given aid (ODA) of the individual countries in would be: Brazil: US\$ 362 million (2009), India: US\$ 639 million (2010), China: US\$ 2 billion (2010), South Africa: US\$ 98 million (2010). In the first research report, I quoted also the other existing figures for each of these countries (see De Bruyn, 2013).

From the available information it can be concluded that cooperation from non-DAC development partners (in this case governments) remains relatively small, but as Kharas (2012) points out, this figures may give only a partial view on the real development cooperation disbursements.

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<sup>7</sup> [www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org](http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org).

### 1.3.2 Going beyond Official Development Aid

One of the main issues of confusion in the discussion about non-DAC development partners in development cooperation arises from the mingling of foreign aid with other kinds of assistance and cooperation. This can be illustrated by looking at the different types of development finance. Development finance encompasses more than solely ODA<sup>8</sup> (see Figure 1.1). The other funding offered by governments - known as Other Official Flows (OOF) - comprises mainly of lending by export credit agencies to stimulate export, military aid, and other OOF which do not adhere to the ODA conditions. Next, the private flows entail at least five different funding mechanisms, as Figure 1.1 shows, but only the private grants (*i.e.* private funding from NGOs, foundations and global funds) are considered as foreign aid (Brautigam, 2011).

**Figure 1.1** Structure of global development finance



Source Brautigam, 2011: 204

A major difference with DAC-donors is that aid is often tied in the development cooperation policies of the non-DAC development partners. Thus the boundaries between aid and commercial interests are blurred. In addition, these partners mix or blend trade, investment and cooperation efforts. Consequently it is difficult, and often impossible, to neatly fit the finance flow into the DAC-scheme. Some flows are a mixture of ODA and OOF with private flows, but are not disaggregated as such (see further). For Brazil, India, China and South Africa the problem is exacerbated by the limited reporting of their development finance to the DAC (Mawdsley, 2012). Thus, when reading and analysing published figures about the BICS' development aid it must be kept in mind that these might incorporate other official financial or/and private flows.

<sup>8</sup> Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been defined by the DAC Committee in 1972 as follows 'to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%)' (OECD, 2009: 1).




### 1.3.3 What about the budgets for cooperation in agriculture and food security and health

Sector specific figures are even more difficult to come by. Actually for none of the BICS it was possible to determine exactly the amount of cooperation per sector.<sup>9</sup> Either there were only aggregate figures available for the total cooperation, or specific channels (such as lines of credit), or disbursement of commitments were only disclosed for a certain type of aid.

Over time the importance of the different organisations and actors in financial terms evolved significantly. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) has calculated the evolution of official development assistance in health between 1990 and 2011. Figure 1.2 illustrates the conclusions and presents the changing landscape of aid donors in health.<sup>10</sup> Traditional bilateral donors still remain important, as do the multilateral agencies with in health the WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS, the World Bank and the European Commission (equivalent of the biggest UN donor in AFS, would be IFAD, Coppard, 2010). An important new actor, especially in the health sector, includes the global health partnerships (GHPs), such as the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (Global Fund), and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI). Importantly, the BICS do not yet feature in this overview.

**Figure 1.2 The evolution of the donor landscape in development assistance in health (1990-2011)**



Source Website of 'a view from the cave'<sup>11</sup> based on Leach Kemon *et al.*, 2011

To have an idea of the investment in health and AFS assistance, the budget of the BICS for overall ODA in AFS and health can be compared with the total estimated assistance from the BICS. AFS and health have always been among the main focal sectors of the traditional development cooperation. In the last two decades the importance of development cooperation in health, incl. reproductive health and population, from DAC members has increased steadily from about US\$ 3.0 billion in 1991 to more than US\$ 20.0 billion in 2011, while that for agriculture and food security cooperation and aid has picked up after a period of decrease at the end of the last


<sup>9</sup> The AidData website might address this question in the future (see [www.aiddata.org](http://www.aiddata.org)). In the following research reports (the country/sector studies on Malawi and Mozambique) the information of this data source will be used.

<sup>10</sup> For complete analysis see Leach Kemon *et al.* 2011 and <http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/tools/data-visualisation/development-assistance-health-channel-assistance-global-1990-2011-interacti#/overview/stories>.

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.aviewfromthecave.com/2012/08/the-changing-landscape-of-development.html>.


century to about respectively US\$ 10.7 billion and US\$ 1.6 billion in 2011 (see Figure 1.3). In relative terms, health, incl. population and reproductive health, has become the most important sector after governance for DAC countries. On the other hand AFS has lost some of its importance in total ODA spending in the last twenty years. Health and AFS are nowadays each responsible for about 6 to 7% of total ODA. Only education, governance, humanitarian aid and transport and storage receive more funding than AFS.

**Figure 1.3 Evolution of the ODA spent per sector in terms of ODA (in 1,000 million US\$)**



Source OECD Stats<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 1.4 Evolution of the relative importance per sector in terms of ODA (on total ODA, in %)**



Source OECD Stats<sup>13</sup>

The overall cooperation budget of the BICS in 2010 (*i.e.* about US\$ 3 billion) represented about 10% of the total ODA budget for health and AFS of the OECD-DAC

<sup>12</sup> <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1#>.

<sup>13</sup> <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1#>.

countries (*i.e.* about 31 billion). The real amount dedicated to AFS and health from the BICS will certainly be much smaller.

The available policy documents and studies show that first and foremost, non-DAC countries invest in 'hard' sectors, such as infrastructure, energy and agriculture, aimed at economic growth instead of poverty reduction. Reasons behind this choice include according to Mawdsley (2012) the direct benefits for donor and recipient (in the sense that donor's countries firms can be contracted) and the belief in the paradigm of economic growth.

This does not mean that the social sectors are neglected. Health and education are foci of several non-DAC countries, and especially Brazil. For instance, agriculture took up 26% of Brazil's technical cooperation's budget in Africa between 2003 and 2010, health about 22% (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). South Africa singled out peace building and conflict resolution (De Bruyn, 2013).

Nevertheless, the concentration on enhancing economic growth has raised the fear of some commentators that this would be at the expense of poverty alleviation and combating inequality, and eventually would mark a return to the modernisation theories of the 1960s and 1980s. The underlying hypothesis is that traditional donors as well as recipient countries would follow the strategy of the non-DAC countries (Mawdsley, 2012). The sectoral differences between DAC- and non-DAC countries can also be interpreted in a more positive manner. In the last two decades the DAC-countries have gradually reduced their assistance in infrastructure and productive sectors. The latter countries fill up this gap. Instead of substituting the existing DAC-development cooperation, they complement it (Kragelund, 2010 & Dreher *et al.*, 2011).

Although probably rather modest in volume, the BICS provides additional means and resources to deal with development challenges (Kragelund, 2010 & Bilal, 2012). Not only international organisations gain extra funds, but also partner countries (or the recipients of assistance). It also implies that the latter become less dependent on the traditional development aid, which makes it easier for them to carve out their own development path. Although, it might mean that certain economic and political reforms will not take place. All in all, the available funds still seem to be too low to bring about these results on a great scale.

## **1.4 The main actors - a field in evolution**

### *1.4.1 Central position of the government*

The organisation of the management and implementation of governmental development cooperation within the BICS and other non-DAC countries is often said to be complex and not well documented (Mawdsley, 2012). Although there are still important questions about the institutions involved, and their decision making power, it is possible to identify some important characteristics, (1) relating to the decision making level; (2) the number of actors involved; (3) the task of the main development agencies; (4) the re-organisation and (5) the strength of the institutional structures.

First, policy making in development cooperation happens at the highest governmental levels. For the BICS, development cooperation is in first instance an instrument of their foreign policy, and thus it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often in conjunction with the

president or the chairman that lays out the priorities of the development cooperation policy. This is best illustrated by the case of Brazil, where former President Lula Da Silva was instrumental in promoting the country's importance as an actor in development cooperation (Vidigal, 2010). At first sight, other stakeholders and policy actors are hardly involved in the decision making process (Davies, 2010). However, as the second feature demonstrates, sector specific actors (and especially ministries) take up an important role.

A second typical feature of many of the non-DAC countries, is the multitude of domestic governmental agencies and departments engaging in the design and the implementation of the development cooperation activities. Responsibilities for the different aspects of development cooperation are thus scattered among various entities. For instance, in Brazil more than 65 institutions could be involved in development cooperation (GHSI, 2012). An exception is China: its policy making and implementation is very centralised, although also here a variety of governmental levels are engaged in the execution of development cooperation. Sector specific ministries and agencies play a much greater role in development (and especially technical) cooperation than in the DAC-countries (Rowlands, 2012). Often they have their own international offices or research centres, which carry out cooperation projects with institutions in partner countries. These institutions are experts in their field and are considered to be the most appropriate actors to share their solutions for addressing domestic development problems with other countries. The country that illustrates this best is Brazil. For health cooperation, the Ministry of Health develops the main policies while Fiocruz, a public health institution, implements the programmes and projects ((Russo *et al.*, 2013). Similarly for agriculture (and specifically agribusiness), the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, and the specialised institution Embrapa are the main actors. Nevertheless, other ministries and institutions play a role as well and sometimes set up competing or parallel programmes. For instance, the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Agrarian Development are involved in food security and small scale farming (Cabral & Shankland, 2012).

Third, the department responsible for development cooperation in general acts primarily as a liaison office (see De Bruyn, 2013). It directs the demands of partner countries to the appropriate department or ministry. This also implies that programs and projects are not necessarily executed by general development specialists, but by technical personnel. A risk - which needs to be further investigated - could be that these experts lack country and cultural specific knowledge and awareness.

Fourth, although a number of non-DAC countries, and especially India, China and Brazil have a long history in development cooperation, most countries are still in the process of re-organising their institutional structure for development cooperation. Many non-DAC countries are making efforts to coordinate and concentrate their activities by setting up central development cooperation agencies. In most cases however, this is still in the first phase. South Africa is setting up its South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) that should coordinate its incoming and outgoing assistance and in 2012 India has established its Development Assistance Partnership within the Ministry External Affairs. Brazil's Agency for Cooperation (ABC) exists already for several decades, but it is mainly responsible for coordinating only a small part of the country's outgoing assistance, *i.e.* technical assistance (De Bruyn, 2013).

Consequently, most non-DAC countries (China is a notable exception) possess a rather weak institutional structure (Mawdsley, 2012). This is reflected in limited trained personnel, insufficient power of development cooperation agencies in comparison to other governmental departments, and difficulties to set up development cooperation strategies, and policies. Mawdsley (2012) points out that the increased attention and investments in development cooperation are rendered difficult by incapacities of the domestic bureaucracies to keep up with this new evolution. The same may be valid for embassies that play an important role in carrying out the development cooperation activities, but they often lack adequate resources and know-how to carry out this task. Lastly, most information deals with central government agencies. Regional governmental levels (states or provinces) might have their own developmental policies in Brazil, India or China. However there is a lack of data on this issue.

#### *1.4.2 The important but under-researched role of the private sector*

Characteristic for the BICS countries is the importance given to the private sector. All four countries engage or promote the private sector in their development cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2013; Gu, 2009; Regnier, 2013; Van Dijk, 2009).

The country studies in De Bruyn (2013) showed that in health, the BICS' private sector includes the pharmaceutical industry and private hospitals, while in agriculture, trading and production companies play a central role. In general though, infrastructure companies and companies active in the extractive industry are among the most influential actors in Africa. However, what role the BICS' private sector plays, is still under-researched. Consequently, an analysis of the development cooperation of the BICS that only takes into account development aid or development cooperation as understood and defined by the DAC, runs the risk of omitting important defining features and actors. The role of the private sector in development cooperation, including the BICS, will also be the object of another study in 2014 of the Policy Research Centre for the Development Cooperation of the Flemish Government.<sup>14</sup>

#### *1.4.3 Absence of civil society*

As with private sector actors, little is known about civil society actors of the non-DAC countries (see also Vaes & Huys, 2013). On the one hand, certain non-DAC countries with a strong civil society, such as Brazil and South Africa would be expected to follow the same path (see for instance Campolina, 2012; Leys 2008). On the other hand, other non-DAC countries seem to disregard CSOs, as well in their own countries as in the partner countries. This might be due to their own historical relations and views on CSOs - as is the case with China. In other cases, especially where development cooperation is seen as an instrument for its own foreign policy, CSOs are regarded as hindrances.

According to Peter Konijn of Knowing Emerging Powers in Africa<sup>15</sup> CSOs of non-DAC countries themselves do not attempt actively to enlarge their scope to development cooperation. It applies for development projects abroad, as well as for lobby and advocacy and critical appraisal of their own government's development cooperation policies. This is not only due to limited interest or resources, but also might reflect an implicit entente between domestic state and non-state actors of not jeopardising the

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<sup>14</sup> See [www.prc-if.eu](http://www.prc-if.eu).

<sup>15</sup> Personal communication June 2013.

countries gradually growing importance in the international arena. The almost complete absence of the civil society sector can be witnessed in the health and agricultural sectors. An important caveat however, is that within international NGOs and international institutions nationals of the BICS might be active.

## **1.5 The discourse of Brazil, India, China and South Africa**

### *1.5.1 Shared (ethical) principles*

All of the BICS and many other non-DAC countries have to a certain extent common values and principles on which they founded their development cooperation. The eight principles of Chinese foreign aid, the conclusions of the 1955 Bandung conference which gave rise to the Non-Alignment Movement and the 1978 UNCTAD Buenos Aires Action Plan are considered as the main inspirations, as the country studies in the first research report show (see De Bruyn, 2013) show.

Important to note is that these principles guide the discourse of the BICS, but not necessarily the practice. Admittedly, this is no different for the DAC-countries. Still, rethorics can serve as legitimising devices, as Strauss (2009, cited in Mawdsley, 2012) points out. In their discourse, the BICS reject the terminology and the approaches of the western DAC donors. Many of the non-DAC countries avoid the terms 'donors' and 'development aid', since they do not consider themselves as such. 'Donor - recipient' relations and 'aid' mirror the 'traditional development practices and ideologies of the western countries', which are imbedded in unequal power relations between countries. Instead, the terms international, development or South-South cooperation and development partners are preferred. Sometimes this is a false opposition. For instance, also in the DAC-terminology aid is increasingly replaced with international or development cooperation, and recipients with partners. Yet the opposition to DAC-donor semantics is important to understand the discourses as well as the practices of BICS' development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012).

The core principles of the BICS can be summarised as followed: equal partnerships, mutual benefits, solidarity, no conditions, no-interference, demand driven and sharing of own experiences. The Brazilian development cooperation frame their policies in 'horizontal cooperation', the South African development cooperation focused on the 'African Renaissance', the Indians refer in their speeches to common colonial histories and the solidarity movement of Gandhi and the Chinese make references to their long-standing eight principles.

Table 1.2 summarises and contrasts the claims imbedded in the discourses of DAC-donors and non-DAC development partners. This is based on work of Mawdsley (2012: 152, supplemented with own comments). Important to keep in mind is that these claims should be read as the common understanding of what development cooperation means in the different contexts. In western countries for instance there has been an important evolution in thinking about development cooperation, away from charity or superior-inferior relationships, but the supposedly dominant implicit paradigm (in other words, what 'the people' think of, when they think of development cooperation) is still as described in the table.

**Table 1.2      The symbolic claims of western donors and southern development partners**

<b>Western donors</b>	<b>Southern development partners</b>
Charity	Opportunities
Moral obligation to the unfortunate	Solidarity with other developing countries
Expertise based on superior knowledge, institution, science and technology	Expertise based on direct experience of pursuing development in poor-country circumstances
The virtue of suspended obligation, a lack of reciprocity	The virtue of moral benefit, and recognition of reciprocity and mutual benefit*
Superior moral values translated in conditions and interference*	Relativistic approach, translated in no-conditions or interference in other countries*

Source Mawdsley: 152, supplemented with own comments (marked with \*)

In international politics, discourse often tends to mask underlying motivations and a different reality. This has also been said about the principles of the non-DAC countries. As Mawdsley (2012: 158) states: 'Whereas the West deploys a symbolic regime of charity and benevolence to obscure this truism, the Southern donors invoke the rethoric of solidarity, mutual benefit and shared identities'. To put it very blunt: ultimately, national interests will be one - if not the - motivating driver of any development policy. In each of the country studies in the first research report (see De Bruyn, 2013) it was apparent that the development cooperation policy was an implicit or sometimes even explicit instrument of the country's foreign policies. So besides solidarity objectives, political and economic motivations play an important role. In this sense, the BICS are by no means different than the DAC donors.

Political objectives include the recognition of the PR China as the sole representative of China, gaining a seat in the UN Security Council for Brazil and India, regional political competition between China and India. Economically, the four countries are looking for new trade partners and export possibilities. Cooperation is also typically tied: a share of the grants or concessional loan should be spent on re-investing in domestic donor firms (by buying products or engaging technical experts). Chandy and Kharas (2011) argue that tied aid from non-DAC donors could be less problematic for recipient countries than tied aid by DAC-donor because in comparison their provided goods and services are cheaper and more adapted to local contexts.

Also health and agriculture play a role in attaining these political and economic ends. Cooperation in these sectors can foster goodwill and stronger ties between countries, it can open up opportunities for trade as well as possibilities for companies to export products or to produce in the partner country.

#### *1.5.2 ... which are reflected in the choice of partner countries*

The strategic political and economic motivations are also apparent in the choice of the partner countries of the BICS (as is the case for the DAC-donors).

A first group of partner countries are the neighbouring countries. Kondoh *et al.* (2010) make the important remark that many of the non-DAC countries (and especially China and India), border on poor and conflict-ridden or politically unstable countries - which is a marked difference with DAC-countries. A second group comprises of countries located in the same region as the donor, for instance Latin America for Brazil, South and South-East Asia for India, East and South-East Asia for China. South Africa's development cooperation is entirely geared towards Africa and especially Southern Africa. Gaining and upholding regional power is one of the main motivations. A third group are countries with which non-DAC donors have some kind of historical or cultural ties. Brazil and its ties with lusophone countries is a case example, while India's diaspora in Africa is an important decisive factor for its geographical engagement. Fourth, to gain global political power and opening up markets in a globalised world, India, China and increasingly Brazil, concentrate on a large number of partner countries all over the world. Furthermore and often forgotten, is that some non-DAC countries also assist Northern countries following natural disasters. Examples include India to Japan after the 2011 tsunami (Mawdsley, 2012).

Lastly, (Sub-Saharan) Africa stands out as recipient or partner region for a growing number of non-DAC countries, and especially the BICS. In fact, most of the literature on the development cooperation of the BICS focuses on this continent, and in particular on the risk that the search for natural resources might spark a new scramble for Africa. Kragelund (2010) argues that the perception of Africa differs significantly between DAC and non-DAC donors. The latter regard African countries as business partners and sources of natural resources, and their development cooperation is taking this (overtly) into account. The former on the other hand see Africa as a 'lost continent'.

### 1.5.3 *The BICS and the Paris principles*

One of the main concerns of the DAC-based development actors, is that the new development partners will endanger the implementation of the so-called aid effectiveness paradigm. Subsequent negotiation rounds in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) have resulted in a set of guiding principles, formulated in the Paris Declaration (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability) and Accra Agenda for Action (predictability, use of partner country systems, conditionality based on partner country's own objectives, untying aid). These principles have been developed and agreed in first instance by members of the DAC-community (thus mainly governmental agencies). Only during the last High Level Meeting in Busan, other actors, including the BICS, had a significant say (Mawdsley, 2012). Several authors have compared DAC and non-DAC approaches to the Paris principles, see for instance Table 1.3. In short, the DAC-countries, as Paulo and Reisen (2010: 539-543) assert, fear 'fragmentation of aid delivery; the violation of corporate and national governance standards; free riding on debt relief; unfair company competition; scramble for extraction rights and resource curse outcomes for poorer countries'.



**Table 1.3 Diverging approaches to the Paris implementation**

Paris principles	DAC donors implementation	Non-DAC development partners implementation
Ownership	National development strategy (or PRSP) outlines priority areas for donors, built up from technical discussion	Ministers/senior officials articulate specific projects for cooperation through high-level political dialogue
Alignment	Use and strengthen recipient institutions and procedures, where feasible. Tying of aid discouraged	Delivery of turnkey projects in short run; capacity building in long term strategy. Tying permissible and widely used
Harmonisation	Use common arrangements to minimise burden on recipients. Multilateralisation of aid encouraged in all instances	Minimise burden by avoiding cumbersome bureaucratic processes altogether. Occasional use of multilateral system where judged to be in interest
Managing for results	Use recipient-led performance assessment frameworks and support performance-based budgeting. Promote international best practice	Focus on delivering aid quickly and at low cost. Use own development experiences and 'how-to' knowledge
Mutual accountability	Make aid transparent and hold each other accountable to Paris commitments via targets and indicators	Ensure aid is mutually beneficial. Agree to fully respect each other's sovereignty and eschew policy conditionality

Source Park, 2011

In the DAC-discourse the equal partnership approach is critiqued for obscuring the unequal power relationships between BICS and other countries (Mawdsley, 2012). Hypotheses include that each of the BICS is a regional (or even global) power, and when looking closer at the limited studies on development practices, their development cooperation might be a one-way street - resembling the donor-recipient relationships of the traditional donors. As mentioned in the Brazilian case studies, the demand drivenness should also be nuanced. Countries seem to provide in practice a list of projects, programmes or sectors that they could or want to support.

Most attention has gone to non-interference and the absence of political conditions. Especially China has been accused of supporting dictatorial regimes, hampering the - according to DAC-donors - necessary democratic reforms. Several authors have urged for more nuance in this debate. They claim that there is insufficient evidence to assert that conditionalities of DAC-donors have caused reforms - internal and external factors would have been more important for these changes (for instance Woods, 2008). In addition, the non-DAC development cooperation is still too small in comparison with DAC-countries to regard it as an alternative that can completely substitute western aid (ECOSOC, 2008).

However, these comparisons mask in itself a number of assumptions. Firstly, it gives the wrong impression that DAC-countries themselves have implemented the principles. However the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration (see Wood *et al.*, 2011) has demonstrated that this is certainly not the case. Mawdsley (2012) suggests that the DAC-community lacks credibility (because of the limited developmental results of the last decades) and legitimacy (because they speak in the name of the development countries). Second, the DAC-principles are implicitly considered as good aid or cooperation, while any deviation from these principles is regarded as bad or ineffective aid. By doing this, automatically possible effective

development cooperation approaches of non-DAC members are discarded. On the other hand, it should be noted that many of the non-DAC countries adhere to the principles as recipients (and thus support that donors in their own countries should follow these), but refrain from doing so as donors (or development partners).

## **1.6 Instruments and modalities of Brazil, India, China and South Africa**

Besides providing extra funds, the BICS and other non-DAC development partners main potential contribution for development cooperation is often said to be the insertion of innovative or alternative effective solutions for development challenges (Kragelund, 2010; Mawdsley, 2012; King, 2010). Although there are important differences between the BICS, their approaches are in general characterised by a focus on bilateral cooperation, the use of (concessional) loans and the blending of aid instruments, an emphasis on technical cooperation, based on their own development experiences. However, another hypothesis is that some of the approaches are not that different of those of certain DAC donors. This is illustrated with China's technical cooperation and infrastructure provision to African countries for which it receives natural resources in return. This approach is copied from Japanese assistance to China twenty years ago (Mawdsley, 2012). Since the BICS have been (and still are) recipients of assistance, it might not come as surprise that they find inspiration (or merely reproduce) their own donors' practices.

### *1.6.1 Bilateral, multilateral increasingly trilateral cooperation*

Cooperation is mainly bilateral in nature, much more than that of the DAC-members - though multilateral cooperation should not be underestimated. Kharas *et al.* (2011) mention figures that show that multilateral aid takes up 18% the total ODA, compared to 30% for DAC-members. For health, Chaturvedi and Thorsteinsdóttir (2012) mention a figure of US\$ 200 million that the BICS have contributed to global health initiatives in 2007-2008. US\$ 40 million would have gone to the GFATM. Mawdsley (2012) explains the preference for bilateral over multilateral cooperation by the limited trust the non-DAC countries have in the international development institutions, due to the latters supposedly poor track record in achieving poverty reduction, economic growth and development, and because they are dominated by western donors and their ideas. A third explanatory factor might be that bilateral cooperation is considered a more effective tool to obtain the economic and political objectives in partner countries, such as for instance trade relationships.

Despite the emphasis on bilateral relations, there is a growing number of trilateral or triangular cooperation initiatives. It remains a question whether the popularity of this form of cooperation will increase in the future. Traditionally, trilateral cooperation involves cooperation between a non-DAC development partner, a DAC member and a 'recipient' country. The northern country provides the funds and the Southern the cooperation. However, there are also examples of three Southern countries working together. The most keen supporter of trilateral cooperation is Brazil. It has set up initiatives with a variety of northern donors, such as Canada, Germany, Spain, Norway, Japan and USAID, as well as the ILO, the FAO and the World Bank, mainly in Portuguese speaking African countries, Latin America and Haiti. Health and AFS have been featuring high on the list of topics, and more specifically vaccinations, malaria eradication, HIV/AIDS food security and school feeding (ECOSOC, 2008; Abdenur, 2007). South Africa is involved in a small number of projects, but not in health or AFS,

while China and India have been until recently reluctant, but are exploring possibilities for trilateral cooperation (Langton, 2012 for India; Stahl, 2012; Pollet, 2011 for China).

### *1.6.2 Financial instruments: credit and grants and the blending of aid*

The BICS make use of these same financial tools as the DAC-countries (grants, free-interest loans, and concessional loans, as well as debt relief), but to different extents. For OECD-DAC donors grants are an increasingly important form of development cooperation, at the expense of concessional loans. Between 2003 and 2008 for instance, the proportion of agricultural ODA provided through grants grew from about half to three quarters of the total agricultural aid. Especially bilateral donors use grants, while multilateral ODA is characterised by concessional loans (Coppard, 2010).

As the country case studies in the first research report show (see De Bruyn, 2013), for the BICS - and especially China and India, loans (also in the agricultural and the health sectors) are the most important financial form of development cooperation. But while the DAC-donors try to separate commercial and official aid flows, the Indian and Chinese approaches are characterised by also incorporating commercial loans in their development cooperation approach. Interestingly, Brautigam (2011a) shows that market based loans might in the current economic conditions be commercially comparable in interest rates and conditions to long-standing concessional loans. In addition, the BICS approach is characterised by the blending of different forms of cooperation. Konijn (2012: 1) has characterised this distinction as follows: 'the approach of the traditional donors is aid-centred and mostly delinked from commercial flows of trade and investment, with an emphasis on social development and good governance. The emerging powers have a business-oriented approach in which aid is a minor ingredient of large integrated packages of (concessional) loans, trade and investment with an emphasis on natural resources extraction and infrastructure development'.

### *1.6.3 Project aid in infrastructure, technical cooperation and scholarships*

While some of the European DAC donors promote budget and sector support, the non-DAC countries do not. A typical feature of the BICS' cooperation is the emphasis on project support. Most of the projects focus on infrastructure, equipment, technical cooperation and trainings and scholarships.

In recent years the big infrastructure projects of China have become almost a symbol of the non-DAC development cooperation. In fact, these are part of the so-called complete projects, in which a Chinese public or private actor or consortium delivers infrastructure, equipment and maintenance in exchange for goods or resources.

BICS and other (Southern) non-DAC countries experienced similar economic or social problems as their partner countries, and might therefore be well-placed to provide adequate solutions, adapted to a developing country context. There is still not enough evidence-based research available to conclude that the cooperation of the BICS renders their approaches more effective. In the first research report (De Bruyn, 2013) a variety of forms of technical cooperation were identified: (1) for half a century China has been sending medical teams (and more recently agricultural teams) to developing countries; (2) the provision of scholarships and short training courses is characteristic for India and China; (3) China sets up agricultural demonstration centres in different countries to train the local farmers and government officials cultivation techniques;

(4) joint research initiatives (see further); (5) diplomatic visits and study tours for officials as well as High Level meetings (for instance the FOCAC, the India-Africa Forum), are organised by Brazil, India and China. Although the prime objective of these meetings and visits is to foster ties and decide on cooperation, they also act as show cases and exchange platforms. As Cabral and Shankland (2012) point out for Brazil, technical cooperation is becoming more complex. Especially the South American country is modifying and implementing successful domestic programmes abroad, such as the More Food Programme and Food Purchase Programmes, the milk banks and Bolsa Familia.

The institutional organisation of the BICS' development cooperation reflects the importance of technical cooperation. As mentioned higher, the main implementers of technical cooperation are sector specific institutions, instead of the development agencies, or specific technical cooperation departments, such as ITEC in India. The question remains whether these technical experts do have sufficient awareness about cultural affinities and local context - limitations for which DAC-members have been criticised in the past. Furthermore, the local conditions between the BICS and their partner countries show differences, and hence programmes or policies which might have been successful in one county are therefore not exactly applicable in another (see for instance Li & Tang *et al.*, 2012 for a comparison between Chinese and African agricultural models). Despite the potential added value of technical cooperation of the BICS - as is also pointed out by the BICS themselves -, in terms of share in the total budget of the government's development cooperation, technical cooperation remains relatively low. Kharas (2012) proposes that this illustrates the high transaction costs related to technical cooperation.

#### *1.6.4 Global advocacy*

Besides the abovementioned modalities, the BICS - and especially China and Brazil employ global diplomacy and advocacy to bring about changes in issues which have an economic or social development impact for countries in the South (Marchàn, 2012; Schläger, 2007). This is especially apparent in health, and more specifically regarding intellectual property and access to medicines (Vidigal, 2012; Russo *et al.*, 2013; GHSI, 2012). Global diplomacy also acts as a soft power tool to enhance the political weight of the BICS on the international level (Russo *et al.*, 2013).

Also in international institutions, some of the BICS tend to take up important leading roles. In May 2013, the Brazilian Roberto Azevedo, a Brazilian, was elected to lead the World Trade Organisation. For the first time a Latin American will take this position. Another Brazilian, José Graziano da Silva is Director General of the FAO since 2012. One year earlier, the assembly of the WHO appointed Dr Margaret Chan of the PR China for a second five year term as director-general of the WHO.

#### *1.6.5 Research and development*

Research and development (R&D) is an increasingly important domain in which the BICS impact on the development challenges of the South. Research institutes are looking for ways to increase productivity of certain crops, and improve the effectivity of farming and irrigation schemes. In the past R&D activities were carried out in the BICS themselves, nowadays joint research initiatives with partner countries are becoming more frequent. PROSUL and PROAFRICA are for instance research programs of

Brazil that support networking building, innovation, joint research and events on science and technology. The programs have supported more than one hundred projects in agriculture, health and other sectors (Costa Vaz & Inoue, 2007). Specifically for cotton Brazil collaborates with institutes from different African countries to increase productivity. In health, Indian, Chinese, Brazilian and South African institutes and companies are developing affordable pharmaceutical products for tropical and communicable diseases (Chaturvedi & Thorsteinsdóttir, 2012).

### 1.7 Thematic areas within health and AFS

Like the DAC-donors, the BICS tend to focus on specific thematic areas within the different sectors. In the country case studies of the first research paper (see De Bruyn, 2013), a number of areas were identified in health and AFS. According to some of the literature, these are agricultural and health challenges to which the individual countries have formulated a (supposedly) successful answer in their own history. It is in these domains that the BICS might have the biggest impact on other development actors.

**HIV/AIDS, malaria and other tropical and/or communicable diseases.** The BICS can share their own solutions with other countries (Mungcal, 2012). Brazil advocates in the global arena the development and provision of generic medicines to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic and in their bilateral relations it is supporting the building of an antiretroviral (ARV) pharmaceutical factory in Mozambique, and promotes sensibilisation campaigns. Also South Africa is characterised by very high HIV/AIDS figures, but the country does not have an active cooperation policy in this field. Its policies act rather as an example on how other countries can deal with the epidemic. China supports malaria control initiatives and it has pledged about US\$ 100 for the building of malaria treatment centres and programmes (GHSI, 2012).

Closely related is the very important role that the BICs, and more specifically India and China take in the **provision of drugs**. Four in five donor-funded HIV/AIDS therapies are provided by Indian manufacturers and between 60 and 70% of all UN-vaccines (GHSI, 2012).

Improving the access to **public health by capacity building and institutional strengthening** is a specialty of Brazil, while reproductive health and family planning are foci of Chinese cooperation (GHSI, 2012).

In nutrition, Brazil has emerged as an influential actor in **fighting child hunger and domestic poverty** via its programmes (Bolsa Familia and Zero Hunger) in which families are stimulated to send children to school and health care facilities by providing nutritional and cash subsidies. Another innovative programme is the Human Milk Banks which promotes breast feeding (Cabral & Shankland, 2013).

In agriculture, China and Brazil are implementing projects and programmes to **enhance agricultural production**. The Brazilian cotton-4 and the ProSavannah projects are examples of Brazil, while China gears its technical cooperation towards sharing own experiences and agricultural models with other countries via for instance agricultural teams and demonstration centres. India's green revolution on the other hand acts as an inspiration for other countries (Cabral & Shankland, 2012).

**Agro-business** is another feature of the BICS. Chinese and Indian state owned or state supported private companies are leasing land in different African countries (Regnier, 2013) and the governments of the BICS are promoting their companies in Africa in order to open up market and export possibilities.

Interestingly, at the same time Brazil and China are supporting **small scale agriculture** (Li & Tang *et al.*, 2012; Cabral & Shankland, 2012). The Brazilian More Food Program departs from family farming to obtain food sovereignty.

The most contentious issue in agriculture are the **land acquisitions** of India, China and Brazil in Africa. These countries are investing and/or buying up land in several African countries. Some argue that this is to produce agriculture products and to export them to their own countries in order to secure their own supposed food insecurity problem (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Others such as Brautigam and Ekman (2012) and Ekman (2012) concluded that the accusations are unfounded for certain partner countries.

Lastly, India is thought to be a key player in the development and cooperation of **ICT-solutions** to support the agricultural and health sectors. More broader, the country has becoming a forerunner in **frugal innovation** - although low cost solutions for developmental problems are said to be a characteristics of all the BICS (Bound & Thornton, 2012).

## 1.8 Coordination

### 1.8.1 *Coordination and cooperation with other donors*

The BICS are renowned for their reluctance to coordinate with the traditional DAC donors, but efforts are made to change this. Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the OECD-DAC, and the UN do feel the emerging presence of some of the non-DAC donors and especially China and Brazil are gradually trying to reach out to these actors. They set up study groups (*i.e.* the China-Africa group and the Task Team on South-South Cooperation set up by the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness of the OECD-DAC), dialogue platforms (such as the Development Cooperation Forum), and trilateral programmes and projects. Still these initiatives have been criticised for being dominated by the 'traditional' development actors (Mawdsley, 2012).

A turning point in the distribution of diplomatic weight and power was the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. It was the first time that DAC and non-DAC countries participated together as donors or providers of development cooperation to discuss models and ways of development cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). As Glennie (2012) and Kitaoka *et al.* (2012) assert, this did not result in agreed principles or standards on aid effectiveness, but it did recognise the growing importance of other than the DAC countries in development aid.

Whether coordination and collaboration between DAC countries and the BICS will improve, remains still a question.

### *1.8.2 Coordination within the BICS*

In addition, the individual countries have made efforts to set up cooperation initiatives, in which continuously new acronyms of their countries' names are introduced: such as BASIC, BRICS and IBSA. Although the main focus of these platforms or organisations is economic or political, they do have spill-overs into development cooperation. BASIC refers to an agreement between Brazil, South Africa and China to take a joint stance on climate change issues. The BRICS is a collaboration between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with a primarily economic and trade objective. Only the future can learn what the importance will be of the recently set up BRICS development bank, and whether it will indeed be able to compete with the World Bank and the IMF as a funding mechanism. IBSA is an alliance between India, Brazil and South Africa with a focus on governance, social and economic development. The IBSA Dialogue Forum is especially worth mentioning. It was established in 2003 in order to enhance economic and political collaboration and to increase the members' voice and influence in the global arena. Sixteen working groups were established and twenty agreements signed, covering amongst others, the health and the agricultural sectors. In 2004, the Poverty and Hunger Alleviation Fund was launched. This fund focuses on knowledge and experience sharing, replication of innovative approaches with regards to alleviating poverty and hunger. The Fund is managed by the UNDP's Special Unit for South-South Cooperation. Each member country provides annually US\$ 1 million. The projects and programmes are implemented by UN agencies and their partners (Vickers, 2012). The Fund has made several investments in health, such as supporting the medical clinics in Africa, assessment of health care systems (e.g. Burundi), providing equipment for health care centres (e.g. in Cape Verde) (Chaturvedi, 2012).

## CONCLUDING REMARKS: TEN WAYS IN THE BICS ARE CHALLENGING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Only in recent years, academicians and policy makers are starting to get an understanding of the involvement and practices of non-DAC actors in development cooperation. In this paper, the main characteristics and modalities of the four which have received the bulk of attention, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, have been summarised on the basis of the existing literature and policy documents. However, it is also obvious that a lot of questions and uncertainties still exist - especially about specific sectors and practices in the field. Furthermore, real facts based evidence is lacking about the contributions and effects of the BICS on development cooperation in general.

Roughly, according to the literature the BICS might be challenging the 'traditional' development cooperation in ten different ways. Important to keep in mind is that the BICS are not a homogeneous group of countries. Besides obvious differences in population, history, governmental system, *etc.* they also differed in their experience, modalities and resources in development cooperation.

1. The BICS, and more specifically China and India, provide an **extra source of financial resources** to the developing countries. Although the total volume is still rather small in comparison to the global volume of development aid (between 2 and 3%), and little is known about the shares for AFS and health, the financial input is on the increase. Furthermore, on the global level it might be rather small, but for specific countries these financial influence of the BICS are considered to be high. Consequently, developing countries are presented more financial options and are becoming less dependent on the resources - and conditions - of the 'traditional development actors'.
2. **The blending of different financial instruments** such as grants, concessional and commercial loans and the typical use of tied aid, is markedly different from what the DAC-countries claim or aspire to do. There is possibility (or for some a fear) that these practices will be adopted by traditional donors or that some of the latter will give up their efforts to for instance untie their aid.
3. The BICS regard development cooperation as an **instrument of their foreign policy**. Cooperation in health, agriculture, natural resources, infrastructure with other countries should not only benefit the partner countries, but also the BICS themselves. Win-win is a key concept in the BICS' development cooperation and might become (again) a central feature in other donors' cooperation strategies.
4. The **discourse of the BICS** is said to be markedly different from that of most of the DAC-countries. Closer scrutiny might show that DAC as well as non-DAC countries emphasise in their rethoric words such as partners and partnerships, solidarity and equality. However, because of their history as 'developing countries', the BICS seem to be more convincing when using this kind of terminology. Nevertheless, the typical language of South-South cooperation might be adopted by a growing number of development actors and - maybe more importantly - challenges certain longstanding notions of development cooperation and the inherent differential power relations imbedded in its language.
5. Specifically the issue of **(non-)conditionality** has been much debated in development circle. For many of the DAC-donors human rights, good governance



and democratic structures are concepts to be reckoned with when deciding whether or not to engage in development cooperation. The BICS have a very different view on this kind of conditionality, and their growing significance may modify the other donors' stances on this issue.

6. While many DAC-donors refrained from prioritising '**hard**' **sectors**, and focused on projects and programs aimed at social issues and poverty alleviation, especially China and India are known to concentrate on infrastructure and focus on **economic growth as motor of development**. This approach might complement the existing western objectives, or might trigger a renewed interest in infrastructure and economic productivity in general by development actors - at the neglect of social sectors such as health and education. On the other hand, Brazil has been a forerunner in health assistance.
7. The **role of the private sector in development** is an increasingly popular topic in the policy and academic world. The BICS - and especially India - are looked at as an example of how the private sector can take the lead in the economic development. However, the role of the private sector in the development cooperation approaches of the BICS is still under-researched.
8. The BICS may insert innovative and effective ways to address development challenges, based on **their own experiences as a developing country**. The underlying assumption is that the BICS show more similarities with other developing countries than the DAC-donor countries. Especially **ICT and frugal solutions for development challenges** are considered as very promising.
9. Specifically in **health** the BICS have demonstrated valuable expertise in HIV/AIDS, malaria and other tropical and/or communicable diseases, the provision of drugs, and public health by capacity building and institutional strengthening. While in **agriculture and food security** fighting child hunger and domestic poverty, enhance agricultural production, agro-business, small scale agriculture have been topics in which the BICS have carved an important place for themselves in the development debate.
10. The re-appearance of the BICS (or the renewed attention for them from the DAC-donors) has raised questions regarding the **coordination** of activities and opened up new possibilities for **cooperation** and **partnerships**, such as trilateral cooperation.

Although the paper managed to identify a number of possible contributions and challenges, the overall conclusion is that there is still a lot of information missing to separate fact from perception and to identify whether and how the BICS are modifying development cooperation on the field. The way in which projects and programmes are developed, implemented and evaluated by the BICS is under-researched. Field and case studies are limited in number.

The next research steps of the study for the Flemish Policy Research Centre for the Development Cooperation of the Flemish Government<sup>16</sup> intend to address some of the knowledge gaps. Specific country studies and tangible and robust data are indeed limited. Consequently it is very difficult to assess whether the BICS are indeed as important a player in development cooperation as one would conclude from the multitude of published books, articles and media attention, and whether above-mentioned challenges are indeed identifiable in practice. The next research papers will

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<sup>16</sup> See [www.prc-if.eu](http://www.prc-if.eu).

look into these issues and analyse the activities and the role of Brazil, India, China and South Africa in the health sector in Mozambique and the agriculture and food sector in Malawi.

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## PARTNERS

Het Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies ([www.globalgovernancestudies.eu](http://www.globalgovernancestudies.eu)) coördineert de derde generatie van het Steunpunt “Buitenlands beleid, internationaal ondernemen en ontwikkelingssamenwerking” voor de Vlaamse Regering. Een Steunpunt heeft als doel de wetenschappelijke ondersteuning van Vlaams beleid.

Het project brengt 17 promotoren en 10 junior onderzoekers (waarvan acht doctoraatsstudenten) samen. Het Steunpunt doet aan (a) dataverzameling en -analyse, (b) korte termijn beleidsondersteunend wetenschappelijk onderzoek, (c) fundamenteel wetenschappelijk onderzoek en (d) wetenschappelijke dienstverlening.

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Het onderzoek is verdeeld over vier thematische pijlers: (i) Internationaal en Europees Recht; (ii) Internationaal en Europees Beleid; (iii) Internationaal Ondernemen; en (iv) Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.

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